US History/US History (Bureau Development Inc.)(1991).ISO/dp/0071/00711.txt

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$Unique_ID{USH00711}
$Pretitle{74}
$Title{On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor
Chapter V     Strength, Organization, & Distribution - 1939 Navy Afloat}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Richardson, Adm. James O.}
$Affiliation{USN}
$Subject{ships
aircraft
naval
fleet
navy
commission
personnel
forces
afloat
year}
$Volume{}
$Date{1973}
$Log{Support Ship*0071101.scf
Forces Afloat*0071101.tab
Distribution*0071102.tab
Fleet*0071103.tab
Personnel*0071104.tab
Reenlistment*0071105.tab
}
Book:        On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor
Author:      Richardson, Adm. James O.
Affiliation: USN
Date:        1973

Chapter V     Strength, Organization, & Distribution - 1939 Navy Afloat

The Actual Operating Navy (the Forces Afloat) in 1939

     Having considered the policy fundamentals, the next requirement is to
consider the organization, composition, and manning levels of ships and
aircraft of the operating Navy (Forces Afloat).

     Some people shrink from the realities of facts and figures.  But to me,
facts and figures seem essential to any adequate understanding of the steps
taken, during the 1939, 1940, and early 1941 period, to prepare for war tasks
that part of the United States Navy assigned to the Forces Afloat.  I believe
that there must be readily available to the reader, in some detail, the data
regarding:

(a) the ships and aircraft in the Forces Afloat of the Navy

(b) the organization of the Forces Afloat into fighting units

(c) the distribution of the Forces Afloat amongst the Seven Seas

     The question always arises in the military student's mind - Did a naval
commander do the best practicable with what he had?"  To judge this, it is
essential in any study of naval history to know, not only what ships and
aircraft a commander controlled, but what personnel he had to work with -
numbers, personalities, and quality.

     Since the above groups of basic naval data for the 1939-1941 period are
but several of the omissions from Morison's History of United States Naval
Operations in World War II (the current semiofficial naval history of the
war), they are, in part, given in this and other chapters and, in part, added
to this book as an appendix, with the hope of rounding out the 1939-1941
naval picture a bit.

     The appendix (A), is a copy of a United States Fleet Notice showing the
organization of the U.S. Fleet at the time of the last major reorganization of
the Fleet prior to the date of my detachment as Commander-in-Chief.

     This Notice also names the principal subordinate commanders in the Fleet.
These are the officers of the Navy and Marine Corps team who strove, during
1939 and 1940, to prepare the Fleet for prospective war missions.

Naval Combat Strength and Organization

     The story of the organization of the fleets and the distribution to them
of the new or recommissioned ships and aircraft, during the 1939-1940 period,
had its elements of improvising and temporizing, since there never were enough
ships or aircraft or personnel to meet the actual needs of the occasion.

     Each fleet commander and each of his principal subordinates advanced very
logical reasons as to why his particular command should be bolstered. The Navy
Department authorities could not meet these demands with the resources which
the President and the Congress made available, except in a very minor way.

Strength of the 1939 Forces Afloat

     January 1, 1939 seems a logical date to start my digest of the facts on
this subject.

     On that date, ships and district craft in the Navy were designated in
either of two general classifications, "in commission" or "out of commission."

     Ships in each of these two general categories were subject to further
special classification such as, "in full commission," "in reduced commission,"
"in commission, in reserve" or "out of commission, in service" or "not in
service."

     The category of "out of commission, in service" covered a multitude of
types of district craft, from self-propelled garbage lighters to seaplane
wrecking derricks and from ferry boats to fuel oil barges.

     Old combatant ships, assigned to training the Naval Reserve, such as the
old gunboats Disbisque (PG-17), Wilmette (IX-29), and Wilmington (PG-8), were
generally maintained out of commission, in service, or when enough officers
and men were available, in commission, in reserve.

     The seagoing Navy (Forces Afloat) on January 1, 1939, nine months before
World War II started in Europe, approximated the same number and strength in
ships and aircraft as had been planned for in the Chief of Naval Operations
"Operating Force Plan, Fiscal Year 1939" issued in the previous May.  This
strength was 329 ships and 1,030 aircraft. 254 of the 329 ships were combatant
and 75 were auxiliaries.

     231 of the 236 combatant ships of the 1939 Navy, which were in full
commission, and 1,030 of the 1,583 operating aircraft in the Navy were
assigned to the Forces Afloat, together with three battleships and fifteen
destroyers in reduced commission with partial (50%) crews on board.

     The combatant ships (249) and aircraft in the Forces Afloat were as
follows:

[See Forces Afloat: Listing of the combatant ships & aircraft - 1939]

     48 of the 104 destroyers, 28 of the 56 submarines, and the 4 light
minelayers were well overage and by the provisions of the Naval Limitation
Treaties which we had signed with Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy,
during the 1921-1936 period, could have been replaced by new ships some years
previously, had Congress been willing to provide the funds. 7 of these overage
destroyers were scheduled to be decommissioned, largely during the second half
of fiscal year 1939. 4 submarines, in addition to the 56 listed above, were in
the process of being placed in commission in reserve.

     51 of the 75 auxiliaries, including all oil the major auxiliaries in full
commission, were assigned to the Forces Afloat.  These included 6 destroyer
tenders, 5 submarine tenders, 2 large seaplane tenders, 2 transports, 2 repair
ships, 8 oilers, and 2 store ships, but only 1 ammunition ship, the USS Nitro
(AE-2).

     Other auxiliaries in full commission included small seaplane tenders,
survey ships, and submarine rescue ships.

     Nearly 200 utility aircraft were assigned to various units of the Forces
Afloat, in addition to the 840 combatant aircraft whose assignment is detailed
above. 553 aircraft were assigned to the Shore Establishment, largely for
training purposes.

     Besides 5 minesweepers and 24 auxiliaries, listed basically as belonging
to the "seagoing forces of the Navy" and included in the 329 ships so
designated, there were 194 other ships and self-propelled craft assigned to
the Shore Establishment.  In general, these were either small combatant ships,
such as 75' patrol craft (61), submarine chasers (11), and eagle boats (8) or
the logistic support craft of the naval districts, such as station ships,
ocean-going tugs, harbor tugs, water barges, or fuel oil barges.  The
submarine chasers, eagle boats, and patrol craft were employed by the district
commandants for the general shipboard training of the Naval Reserve, and for
intensive training of selected Naval Reserve units in inshore antisubmarine
operations.  Nearly all these small ships and craft had reduced or skeleton
crews on board, and many were not in full commission or in reduced commission,
but were "out of commission, in service."

[See Support Ship: USS Argonne, a Fleet submarine tender, servicing submarines
V-1, V-2, and V-3.]

     The 553 aircraft assigned to the Shore Establishment were engaged largely
in training regulars (288 aircraft assigned) and reserves (182 aircraft
assigned) to fly, and in performing experimental work, or as a means whereby
already qualified naval aviators on shore duty could maintain their essential
flying proficiency.

     In the Reserve Fleet, not in commission, and with no crews on board, were
208 ships and craft.

     On January 1, 1939, the Navy Department, due to personnel and money
limitations established by the Congress, was planning on keeping the Forces
Afloat at the same strength throughout the remaining six months of fiscal
1939, but some of the older ships were to be replaced with new ships coming
out of the building yards.

Organization of Six Subdivisions of Forces Afloat

     In the Forces Afloat, all the combatant ships and aircraft, and most of
the auxiliaries, were distributed amongst:

[See Distribution: Subdivisions of the Forces Afloat]

     Each of these six major subdivisions operated directly under the orders
of the Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy Department at Washington.

     The United States Fleet, the largest subdivision of the Forces Afloat,
was largely in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.  Except for the submarines and the
Atlantic Squadron, all units were based on Long Beach and San Diego,
California.  The submarines of the United States Fleet were based at New
London, Connecticut, Coco Solo, Canal Zone, San Diego, California, and at
Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii.  The newly renamed and expanded squadron of
the Fleet, maintained in the Atlantic Ocean, was based on Norfolk, Virginia,
and Newport, Rhode Island, as reported in the Secretary of the Navy's Annual
Report.


The Atlantic Squadron, United States Fleet was organized in January, 1939, and
includes the former training detachment, United States Fleet, in addition to
certain other vessels.


     The Asiatic Fleet, the second largest subdivision of the Forces Afloat
(38 ships, 6 VSO planes [Scouting], and 2 VJ planes), was in the Western
Pacific Ocean and based on the Philippines and China.

     The Special Service Squadron, consisting of two gunboats and two
destroyers, operated along the coasts of Central America and was based on
Panama.

     Squadron 40-T, consisting of one light cruiser and two destroyers, was in
Spanish waters as a result of the necessity of having protection closely
available for United States citizens and interests during the Spanish Civil
War.

Naval Transportation Service

     The Naval Transportation Service consisted of ten ships, oilers,
ammunition ships, and transports that carried fuel oil and ammunition to the
ships of the various fleets, and distributed personnel and supplies from the
Shore Establishment to the fleets.

Special Duty

     The twenty-one Special Duty ships were all small.  They varied from
hydrographic survey ships to experimental ships under the Bureau of Ordnance
or Bureau of Engineering.  They included the station ships at Guam, Samoa, and
at the headquarters of the various continental naval districts, as well as the
yachts for the President and Secretary of the Navy.

The United States Fleet

     The great majority of combatant ships and fighting aircraft of the Navy
were in the United States Fleet during 1939.  This is shown in the following
table, which indicates the number of ships and aircraft in the United States
Fleet out of the total in commission in all the Navy:

[See Fleet: Total Ships and Aircraft in Commission]

Subdivisions of United States Fleet

     The United States Fleet had five major combatant subdivisions:

 The Battle Force

 The Scouting Force

 The Atlantic Squadron

 The Submarine Force

 The Fleet Marine Force

and a sixth major subdivision was made up of auxiliary craft:

 The Base Force

     The Battle Force was the largest unit of the U.S. Fleet and had:

5 out of 5 carriers
360 combatant aircraft,
15 utility aircraft
12 out of 15 battleships
14 out of 15 light cruisers
68 out of 85 destroyers
1 out of 1 minelayer
4 out of 4 light minelayers

The Scouting Force had:

12 out of 16 heavy cruisers
1 out of 15 light cruisers
4 VCS squadrons with a total of 64 planes
5 patrol wings out of the 5 patrol wings, with a total of 20 squadrons
having
204 patrol planes

The Atlantic Squadron had:

3 out of 15 battleships
9 out of 25 destroyers

     It is apparent from the above that, in June 1939, I was about to command
the third most important subdivision of the Forces Afloat - the Battle Force
of the U.S. Fleet - and that if all went well, I would then have the Number
One billet afloat, command of the United States Fleet; a sailor-man's dream
come true.

Operating Force Plan 1940

     Just before I went to sea duty in June of 1939, the Chief of Naval
Operations issued the latest version of his "Operating Force Plan, Fiscal Year
1940" and his "Assignment of Vessels in the Organization of the Seagoing
Forces of the U.S. Navy, Fiscal Year 1940."  Perhaps I should add that the
"Operating Force Plan" each year, amongst other things, prescribed the
authorized allowance of enlisted personnel for each ship, aircraft unit, and
unit of the Fleet Marine Force.

     This Operating Force Plan provided for operating, during the 1940 fiscal
year, 368 ships and 1,714 aircraft in commission, and a Fleet Marine Force of
5,243.  Of the 116,000 enlisted personnel in all the Navy, 89,403 were to be
in the Forces Afloat.

The 368 ships included:
5 battleships, 3 of which were in reduced commission
6 aircraft carriers
18 heavy cruisers
19 light cruisers
127 destroyers, 28 of which were in reduced commission
64 submarines, 6 of which were in reduced commission
1 minelayer
22 minesweepers
10 patrol craft
5 submarine rescue ships
81 auxiliaries

Of the 99 destroyers in full commission,
13 were 1,850 tons
60 were 1,500 tons
26 were 1,200 tons (all overage)

     All of the 28 destroyers in reduced commission were overage.  Of the 64
submarines, 32 were overage.

     As given previously, the comparative figures for the 1939 fiscal year had
been 329 ships in commission, 1,583 aircraft, and a Fleet Marine Force of
4,731 men (out of a total of 18,000 Marines).  200 ships and craft, not in
commission, remained in the Reserve Fleet.  Roughly speaking, the June 1939
plans for fiscal 1940 were to have 40 more ships and 130 more aircraft in
commission, and 1,000 more Marines and 6,000 more naval personnel than in
fiscal 1939.

     With the major nations of Europe feverishly building up their armed
strength, it seems incredible now that the United States, in mid-1939, was so
unaware of this buildup, or so unafraid of it, that the Navy (at that time our
first line of defense) was allowed only a 6,000-man increase in its enlisted
strength, and the Marine Corps was given only a piddling 1,000-man increase,
by the Congress and the President.

     It is apparent that, at that late date, the President, the Budget Office,
and the Congress had permitted for fiscal 1940 somewhat less than the small
average percentage increase in naval personnel (5 percent to 10 percent) which
had been authorized during the previous three years.

     The actual enlisted personnel strength of the Navy during the fiscal
years 1936-1939, and as planned at the start of fiscal year 1940 was as
follows:

[See Personnel: Enlisted Strength broken out by Fiscal Year]

     In naval personnel preparedness, we were losing ground steadily:
relative to our material preparedness, as evidenced by the following extracts
from official SECNAV Annual Reports.


During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1939, new construction both for the
orderly replacement of overage vessels and aircraft and for the orderly
augmentation of existing strength, authorized by the act of May 17, 1938, was
continued with the view to bringing our naval strength up to that authorized
by the Vinson-Trammel Act of 1934 and the Naval Expansion Act of May 17,
1938.  Work was started on. . .

     2 battleships
     2 cruisers
     8 destroyers
     6 submarines

. . .provided for in the Naval Appropriation Act of April 4, 1938, and,
in addition, work was also started on the. . .

     2 battleships
     1 aircraft carrier
     2 cruisers

. . .provided for in the Second Deficiency Act of June 25, 1938.

     The 1940 Appropriation Act contains funds for commencement of further
replacements and augmentations of. . .

     2 battleships
     2 cruisers
     8 destroyers
     8 submarines

     This Act also contains funds for the modernization of the aircraft
carriers Lexington and Saratoga.  By the act of April 20, 1939, authorization
was obtained for the modernization of the three large submarines, Argonaut,
Nautilus and Narwhal.

     On July 1,1939 there were 105 ships under construction.

     . . . the following new ships were placed in commission during the year
     [1939]

     2 aircraft carriers
     1 heavy cruiser (8" guns)
     3 light cruisers (6" guns)
     8 destroyers
     4 submarines
     1 oil tanker

     Other ships (not new) placed in full commission. . .

     2 minesweepers
     1 cargo ship
     1 harbor tug


Aircraft Carriers

     I have heard some post-World War II criticism that the pre-World War II
Navy should have had more aircraft carriers in it.  The answer to this is that
the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty was still in effect up until January 1, 1937.
By this treaty, the United States, contrary to the advice of its naval
advisors, had agreed to limit itself to 135,000 tons of underage aircraft
carriers.  The 1938 Naval Expansion Act, the first naval expansion act after
the expiration of the "22" and "30" Naval Limitation Treaties, to obtain the
approval of the Congress, increased this aircraft carrier tonnage to only
175,000 tons, despite urging by naval representatives for a much higher total
tonnage.  Underage aircraft carriers of 175,000 total tonnage were either in
commission in 1939 or building by late 1939.  All were available when the war
started in December 1941.  If there is any blame to be assigned, it belongs to
the Congress.

Naval Auxiliaries and Amphibious Types

     In July of 1939, the Secretary of the Navy bluntly advised the President
that, "The status of our naval auxiliaries is still very unsatisfactory."

     For reasons not understandable to me, President Roosevelt always had it
in his mind that, by and large, our merchant marine overnight could become our
Fleet Base Force or Fleet Train and be available immediately for an overseas
movement of combatant and expeditionary forces.  Even had the immediate
changeover from merchant service to naval service been a practicability, the
overall sea power problem would not have been solved, for the United States
still would need these same ships for our merchant marine in time of war.  By
the most optimistic ship-building estimate, it would take a year to expand the
 shipbuilding industry and build the first of the replacement merchant ships
in the new facilities, and there would not be a year to spare.

     The Navy knew that many passenger-carrying merchant ships, within weeks,
could be converted so as to carry troops from dock to dock in friendly ports.
But the Navy also knew that major and time-consuming alterations were
necessary to change these passenger ships into amphibious attack transports
required to handle the various types of small naval landing craft needed for
landing troops or special army equipment, in a ground swell on a hostile
shore.

     And as for some of the types of auxiliaries which accompany the Fleet to
the combat zones, such as repair ships, ammunition ships, or refrigeration
ships, they have to be naval built from the keel up to be fully effective for
use in combatant zones of operation.

     It was undoubtedly correct reasoning that, as the Fleet was expanded
during a war, by adding combatant ships laid down subsequent to the war's
start, ships of the Fleet Train to serve them, could be converted from
merchant ships and replacements built as fast as needed.  But this concept was
wholly fallacious with respect to the existing Fleet, which had to carry out
the initial overseas operations.

     Although President Roosevelt had done marvelous things in building up the
combatant Navy during the period 1933-1939, he just could not or would not do
much about providing the Fleet with the necessary ships for amphibious
operations and for the Fleet Train, in advance of an immediate need.

Manning Levels 1930-1940

     During this decade each ship and aircraft unit was furnished with a
prescribed "complement" sheet, which gave the total number of officers and men
and listed the various ranks and ratings and special qualifications, which the
Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation considered
would be adequate to man the ship or aircraft in battle.

     Each ship and aircraft unit also was furnished with a prescribed
"allowance" sheet, which was the number of officers and men which the Chief of
Naval Operations was able to allot as its honest share of the total number of
personnel authorized and appropriated for the Navy, by the Congress, in the
current fiscal year.

     The personnel complement was presumably based on the minimum number of
personnel needed to fight the ship or aircraft, that is, to man all guns,
torpedoes, or other armaments and to steam the ship at full power for four
hours, or to fly the airplane for its limit of endurance in the air.

     The personnel allowances, except for submarines and single aircraft, were
markedly less than the complements.  The latter varied from year to year,
depending on the appropriations of the Congress.  In general, however, during
the period 1930-1939, the allowances for major combatant units were from 80
percent to 85 percent of the complement.  For less important ships and units,
they varied between 50 percent and 80 percent of complement, with the average
about 65 percent.

Men for Ships

     It was a naval truism that, when the threat of war was slight, it took
longer to build ships and aircraft than it took to train the personnel to man
them.

     It is part of the naval tradition that this truism reverses itself during
the period just prior to a war, or during a war, when shipyards and aircraft
factories are manned by three shifts of workmen around the clock, but the
individual officer or sailorman cannot receive instruction in a school or on a
ship around the clock.  During such emergency or war periods, ships can be
built faster than officers and men can be brought in from civilian life and
trained to fight them effectively.

     So, during the 1930-1939 period, it had been considered, by a succession
of Chiefs of Naval Operations, far better to train at one time 100 Commanding
Officers, 100 pilots, 100 navigators, 100 chief boatswains mates or chief
watertenders, or even 100 leading seamen in 100 ships and aircraft, with only
partial crews, than it was to train only 85 of the same personnel in 85 ships
and aircraft, even though the latter arrangement would provide each ship with
a full crew and would provide replacement crews for a number of aircraft.

     By the chosen arrangement, every officer and man was, in effect, training
in a little better billet, or getting into the billet at a younger age than if
the ships had been fully manned, or each aircraft provided with a crew to keep
it in the air whenever it would fly.  It was a very limited way of training
for the expected war - expansion of personnel, ships, and aircraft.

     During the 1930-1940 decade, most ships and aircraft units operated year
in and year out with even less than their prescribed allowance of personnel
actually on board, to say nothing of less than the prescribed complements.

     This was due to a reluctance of the Congress to admit that there would
always be a considerable number of personnel in the Navy in transit between
duty stations, sick in hospitals, attending short-term schools, or on
reenlistment or other leave, and to provide adoquately for this percentage of
personnel (about 8 percent) over the total of the allowance of all ships,
aircraft, and stations to be kept in commission.

     So, the Navy learned to do the best it could with what it had, and
operated short-handed.

Inadequacy of Enlisted Complements

     By 1937, every seasoned naval officer realized that the complements had
more than an aura of unreality about them because of:

     (a) the twenty-year period since our Navy had been in combat operations

     (b) the tremendous technical developments during this twenty-year period
which had not been put to the actual test of combat operations

     (c) long continued inability to overcome Congressional reluctance to
authorize the funds necessary for increased naval personnel.

     The result was that the "paper" war complements became very unrealistic.
It might well be asked why the individual Commanding Officer of a ship did not
do more letter writing on the subject.

     A Commanding Officer of a destroyer, whose complement of enlisted
personnel was 132, and whose allowance was 112 or 106 or 83, and who spent
many hours trying to obtain an allocation of additional seamen or firemen from
higher authority so that his ship would have its authorized 112 or 106 or 83
men actually on board, could not get very interested in trying to obtain an
increase in a theoretical "paper" complement for his ship from 132 to 140 or
150.  The complement was a "heaven" far in the future from the day-to-day
heavy tasks of the present, which had to be accomplished with the number of
officers and men actually on board.

     The unreality of the allowances and complements is succinctly illustrated
by the following data.

     On July 1, 1940, the allowance of men for the heavy cruiser Indianapolis
(CA-35) was 588 men.  The complement was 685 men.  On July 5, 1940, the CNO
increased this allowance by 11 percent, or 68 men, to a total of 656.  Twelve
weeks later on September 28, 1940, the CNO increased by 184 men the allowance
over the July 1 allowance to 772, or a 31 percent increase.  A week later, on
October 4, 1940, the CNO indicated that the allowance of the Indianapolis was
to be further increased on July 1, 1941, to 876, or 49 percent greater than
the allowance had been a year previously.

     Thus, in the short space of four months, the Chief of Naval Operations
showed an appreciation of the necessity of increasing the number of men aboard
the heavy cruiser type of ship by nearly 50 percent.  Even this marked
increase turned out to be inadequate, as the wartime complement of the
Indianapolis and all similar types of heavy cruisers was 1,024, roughly 75
percent more men than the ship had on board for its training for war in
1939-1940.

     These paper changes were indications of a belated recognition of the need
for a vastly increased allocation of personnel.  But, the paper changes
couldn't produce men.  The Commanding Officer of the Indianapolis, in
submitting his report on the December 7, 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
said, "The ship was 170 men under its allowed complement."  This statement
indicated that the ship had on board only a few men more than her July 1, 1940
complement.""

     My successor as the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation (Rear Admiral C. W.
Nimitz, USN) softly summed up this very serious enlisted personnel shortage
situation in his 1939 Annual Report:

     To man the ships in commission during the fiscal year 1939, the annual
appropriation provided funds for a total enlisted strength insufficient to
fill the various complements.

Quality and Morale

     Despite the very inadequate numbers of enlisted personnel, their quality
and morale were very high.

     The quality of the 1939-1940 sailorman was evidenced during World War II
when tens of thousands showed themselves so well qualified in their
professional navigating, engineering, gunnery, communications, or supply
duties as to be able to fleet up to officer rank and to discharge their duties
in an extremely capable manner.

     The height of the morale of the enlisted man was evidenced by the very
large percentage who reenlisted regularly in the Navy, despite the fact that
the period from July 1, 1934 to June 30, 1940 (except for the sharp recession
in the latter half of 1937) was a six-year period of generally decreasing
national unemployment.

     The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation in his Annual Reports provided the
following figures:

[See Reenlistment: Percentage Trends 1935-1940]

Officer Shortage

     On June 30, 1939, there were 6,877 Line officers on the active duty list,
700 under the allowed strength of 7,562.  The increase during the year had
been only 346.

     By and large, I viewed the 1939 officer shortage with far less concern
than the enlisted shortage.  The ordinary college graduate in the United
States can be taught the bare fundamentals of naval leadership in four months.
He can be taught the technique of one particular subordinate billet in another
six months, and he can be adapted to the seagoing life in a year.  But, it
takes four to six years to make the ordinary grammar or even high school
graduate into a leading petty officer, skilled in diagnosing the ills of an
aircraft engine, a radar, a radio, a torpedo, a gun, or a fire control
instrument.

     I knew that our 1939 Line officer corps in the Navy was of extremely
broad professional competence.  A rigid selection up system of promotion had
been in effect for twenty-three years for the promotion of the seagoing
officer to the three highest grades of officer.  Selection up for the more
junior grades had been in effect for five years.  Our Selection Boards had
acquired a well earned service-wide reputation for fairness.  By and large,
they had weeded out all the incompetents and a large percentage of the barely
competent.

     Elimination from active duty of from 20 percent to 30 percent of those
remaining in each Naval Academy class, as they acquired service enough to be
considered for selection to the next higher grade, had accentuated in nearly
all seasoned seagoing officers an urgent desire to become thoroughly qualified
in all aspects of their part of the naval profession.

     In 1939, I was sure that we could fill our junior officer ranks in the
Navy with large-scale promotion of our leading petty officers to officer rank
- to give high-grade technical direction - and with large-scale appointment
directly from civil life for general leadership purposes.  It would take two
or three civilians in uniform to do one young regular officer's job, but it
could be done.

     The 7,000 regular Line officers would provide the overall leadership and
direction for the naval campaigns of the war; which would be needed for
victory.  I did not visualize the great extent of the expansion that lay
ahead, but I was extremely confident of my fellow officer and the professional
sailorman.

     As aptly put by Commodore Dudley W. Knox in his A History of the United
States Navy, in speaking of World War II:

     By 1945 the regular was spread very thinly through the Navy.  Yet the
original officer corps had managed to transfuse its high spirit as well as its
basic bar College and Naval Academy indoctrination and training to the much
larger group of reserve officers to a truly astonishing degree.

     A long line of my predecessors had done their work well, and when, in
June 1939, I left the Bureau of Navigation and went to sea, it was with
confidence regarding the officer situation, but with many doubts in regard to
the enlisted situation.  New ships were being built faster than we could man
them with thoroughly competent crews.